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Swami Narasimhananda
ocial networking sites do not generally mention the users’ religion. What is religion? Is 
it necessary? Is it a set of rules to abide by, a set of beliefs, or an indiscriminate following by the 
not-so-privileged people? The word ‘religion’ is derived from the Latin religare, which means 
that which binds. Yet, apart from other meanings of obligation and reverence, it has come to mean 
a set of practices that liberate a person. Thus the irony of religion starts at its very definition. How-
ever enthusiastic and universal that definition may sound, does everyone believe in this meaning? It 
is clear that religion is a sea of dichotomies and contradictions, struggles and victories, strengths and 
weaknesses, bondage and liberation—it is a portrayal of the evolution of humankind.
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Today, conventional identities based on reli-
gion and cultures are being questioned and new 
identities are evolving. Thus when traditional 
constructs are eluding us, we may well question 
the need for religion in this digital age. The an-
swer can be seen in the words of a thinker: ‘The 
rebirth of religion does not happen in times of 
political conservatism. Quite the opposite. It 
flourishes in hyper-technological times such 
as our own, in periods of major moral decline, 
when great ideologies are on their last legs. It’s 
then that we need to believe in something. It 
was when the Roman Empire was at the height 
of its powers, when its senators were frolicking 
openly with prostitutes and wearing lipstick, 
that Christianity took root. It’s a matter of nat-
ural rebalancing.’1 This ‘rebalancing’ forces us 
to understand religion as a humanizing factor 
in this world. 
Coming across someone of a different reli-
gion, culture, language, or nationality is a thou-
sand times more likely today than in earlier 
generations. Therefore, we also need to under-
stand religion to live in peace with fellow humans 
who have different religious affiliations. We need 
to urgently re-examine religion, and if necessary, 
find a new workable and cogent definition of it. 
Swami Vivekananda has given us such a defin-
ition and it is for us to understand and apply it 
to the religious and social field.
Keynotes of Religion
Popular ideas about religion are often narrow 
and misleading. Some ideas, however, point to 
a brighter and broader possibility. Vivekananda 
gave us a broad and yet minimal definition of re-
ligion: ‘Each soul is potentially divine. The goal 
is to manifest this Divinity within by controlling 
nature, external and internal. Do this either by 
work, worship, or psychic control or philoso-
phy—by one, or more, or all of these—and be 
free. This is the whole of religion. Doctrines, 
or dogmas, or rituals, or books, or temples, or 
forms, are but secondary details.’ 2 This definition 
needs a careful analysis to find its relevance in 
the contemporary context. The keyword in this 
definition is ‘soul’. It is interesting and intrigu-
ing that the subject was a soul to Vivekananda, 
not merely a human being. When we are busy 
fighting today for the rights of various identities 
based on gender and other factors, here is a por-
trayal of religion, an institution known to exist 
only among humans, as something belonging to 
each soul. Coming from a tradition that believes 
every living being is a soul, Vivekananda defin-
itely meant ‘soul’ to apply to every living being. 
That is why he said: ‘In the lowest worm, as well 
as in the highest human being, the same divine 
nature is present. The worm form is the lower 
form in which the Divinity has been more over-
shadowed by Maya; that is the highest form in 
which it has been least overshadowed. Behind 
everything the same divinity is existing, and out 
of this comes the basis of morality’ (1.364).
The next keyword of this definition is ‘poten-
tially divine’. Apparent failings or imperfections 
are relegated to non-importance and ‘each soul’ 
is said to have the acme of perfection, divinity, 
already lodged within oneself. With the assertion 
of this potential divinity, the immediate conun-
drum that crops up is the observance of failings. 
How do you explain the now frequent rapes and 
shooting by psychopaths, with all their ‘poten-
tial divinity’? To avoid rushing to pronounce this 
definition flawed, Vivekananda comes with the 
successive sentence bringing sense and pragma-
tism to the idea of potential divinity of souls. The 
next words, ‘manifest this Divinity within’ shows 
the necessity to turn the potential into kinetic or 
unmanifest to manifest. Divinity is inherent but 
not always pronounced. This explains the dichot-
omy of good and evil, and the layers in between, 
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that we are used to seeing in this world. There is 
another keyword ‘the goal’. When put in absolute 
terms, like in this definition, ‘the goal’ assumes 
an overarching importance. This goal is not an 
interim one but a lifetime goal. Beginning with 
the common denominator of ‘soul’, the definition 
extends the commonality to the lifetime goal of 
all living beings. This sentence proclaims that 
all living beings have the same lifetime goal of 
achieving manifestation of the hidden divinity. 
The next part of the definition deals with vari-
ous means to manifest the potential divinity. It 
calls us to ‘be free’, and that is the next keyword. 
In contrast to the extant definitions of religion, 
both popular and academic, Vivekananda’s def-
inition does not bring any sense of bondage with 
it. On the other hand, we are assured of our po-
tential divinity and are beckoned to start a jour-
ney to manifest this divinity and ‘be free’. While 
religion is almost always viewed as a bunch of 
mythical, social, and cultural constructs binding 
an individual, Vivekananda’s definition erases 
the bindings and stresses freedom. Some soci-
ologists concur with this definition. We need a 
religion that is not structural but liquid and func-
tional, catering to every subject. Summarizing 
the thoughts of the sociologist of religion Georg 
Simmel (1858–1918), a social thinker writes:
Simmel does not find religion able to fulfill the 
spiritual need of his time. The major problem 
is that his contemporaries look at religion as a 
set of claims. Religion has become a large, bur-
eaucratic system that does not give room for the 
sincerity, subjectivity, and the expressive need 
that seems to accompany the new type of mod-
ern individuality. Simmel represents a romantic 
trend and emphasizes symbols, meaning, the 
unique, and subjective sincerity. He suggests a 
radical reconstruction of the spiritual life. One 
must fully grasp the meaning of the idea that re-
ligion is not a set of beliefs but an ‘an attitude of 
the soul’ or a perspective, a way of looking at the 
world. Simmel shares the scepticism towards 
dogma, which was prevalent at his time, where 
the idea is that faith itself is more important 
than the object of faith. For him, reality is div-
ided between the subjective and the objective, 
and a third realm is created by the interaction 
of human beings that may serve as a bridge be-
tween the two. In this way, religion is a reality 
capable of bridging the rift between the sub-
jective and the objective. One may say that Sim-
mel suggests an objectless religion, although 
he would hardly characterize it as a secular re-
ligion, which Victoria Lee Erickson does. The 
reason is that secular religion clings to a specific 
content, which Simmel rejects.3
Vivekananda’s definition of religion relegates 
all ‘secondary details’ to secondary importance. 
These secondary details are generally considered 
the ‘specific content’ of religion. The spiritual is 
relinquished for the material. It should be the 
other way round. What is to be focused on is the 
‘attitude of the soul’. It is both interesting and 
reassuring to find thinkers like Simmel arrive at 
conclusions similar to those of Vivekananda’s, 
albeit from very different points of departure set 
in equally different cultural contexts. 
Freedom and Strength: The Litmus Test
One of the underlining aspects of Vivekananda’s 
concept of religion is that it should lead to free-
dom. ‘Liberty is the first condition of growth,’ 4 
and it is the deciding factor of one’s success in at-
taining lifelong goals. In the footsteps of his mas-
ter, Sri Ramakrishna, Vivekananda advocated a 
catholic path to understanding one’s personality. 
He was so liberal in the prescription of methods 
to ‘be free’ that he was open to new spiritual prac-
tices being adopted by the monastic organization 
he created, the Ramakrishna Math, after his pass-
ing. A prophet is known by the path he shows. 
Buddha is known for the eightfold path; Moham-
mad for his path of solidarity; Christ for his path 
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of love. Sri Ramakrishna, the prophet of harmony 
and renunciation, and his illustrious disciple, are 
known for being open to all paths to freedom. 
Along with freedom, strength was the sine 
qua non of religion according to Vivekananda: 
‘strength is life, weakness is death’ (2.3). Re-
ligion should not be a weakening, binding, 
or frightening force. He exhorted: ‘Mystery 
mongering and superstition are always signs 
of weakness. These are always signs of degrad-
ation and of death. Therefore beware of them; 
be strong, and stand on your own feet’ (3.279). 
‘And here is the test of truth—anything that 
makes you weak physically, intellectually, and 
spiritually, reject as poison; there is no life in 
it, it cannot be true’ (3.224–5). Religion is not 
weakening mysticism or lifeless mockery. 
To Vivekananda religion was not sombre and 
binding but exuberant and liberating. This view 
is ascribed to by some other thinkers too: ‘The 
Nazis used to shout “Gott mit uns” (“God is with 
us”), and were full of pagan religiosity. Once 
atheism becomes a state religion, as in the Soviet 
Union, there is no longer any difference between 
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a believer and an atheist. Either of them become 
fundamentalists, extremists. … It isn’t true that re-
ligion is the opiate of the masses, as Marx claimed. 
Opium would have neutralized the masses, anaes-
thetised them, put them to sleep. Actually, reli-
gion stirs up the crowds: it is the cocaine of the 
masses.’ 5 This ‘cocaine’ impels one to do things, 
good or evil. As Vivekananda said:
Though there is nothing that has brought to 
man more blessings than religion, yet at the 
same time, there is nothing that has brought 
more horror than religion. Nothing has made 
more for peace and love than religion; noth-
ing has engendered fiercer hatred than religion. 
Nothing has made the brotherhood of man 
more tangible than religion; nothing has bred 
more bitter enmity between man and man than 
religion. Nothing has built more charitable in-
stitutions, more hospitals for men, and even for 
animals, than religion; nothing has deluged the 
world with more blood than religion.6
Though religion has shed a lot of blood, it is 
also the lifeblood of many cultures, particularly 
in India: ‘In India, religious life forms the centre, 
the keynote of the whole music of national life’ 
(3.220). Vivekananda wanted a reshaping of reli-
gion, not its destruction, keeping it at the centre 
of all growth.
Why Do Non-believers Differ?
To understand non-believers, we need to exam-
ine the thought of some such thinkers, both 
past and present. During the course of this an-
alysis, it will become evident that these thinkers 
base their findings on models of religion other 
than Vedanta, or even Buddhism. Vivekananda 
also had the same objections against the extant 
religions and redefined religion taking it closer 
to Vedanta.
Bertrand Russell was probably one of the 
most scientific non-believers of all time. He 
believed that the very system of belief was un-
warranted. According to him, if there was a truth 
in a statement, it had to be accepted. If there was 
no truth in a particular statement, it had to be 
rejected. Belief by itself had no meaning. Russell 
wove his argument around a wonderful illustra-
tion now famous as ‘Russell’s Teapot’:
Many orthodox people speak as though it were 
the business of sceptics to disprove received 
dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove 
them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to 
suggest that between the Earth and Mars there 
is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an 
elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to dis-
prove my assertion provided I were careful to 
add that the teapot is too small to be revealed 
even by our most powerful telescopes. But if 
I were to go on to say that, since my assertion 
cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presump-
tion on the part of human reason to doubt it, 
I should rightly be thought to be talking non-
sense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot 
were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the 
sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into 
the minds of children at school, hesitation to 
believe in its existence would become a mark 
of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the 
attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened 
age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.7
The religion taught by Vivekananda can be 
practised and its truth found by anyone who 
does rational experiments in spirituality, much 
like observations through a telescope. Viveka-
nanda’s religion does not require catechism!
Russell’s position has since become the clas-
sical stand of non-believers, both agnostics and 
atheists. While Russell was an agnostic, thinkers 
such as the noted evolutionary biologist Richard 
Dawkins are pronounced atheists. It is interesting 
to note that almost all of the non- believers have 
not considered Vedanta, eloquently preached by 
Vivekananda, as a thought system. Either they 
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were unaware of it, as in most cases, or had con-
veniently ignored it, as in the case of Indian non-
believers. We understand this if we look at the 
reasons for non-belief given by Bertrand Russell 
or others. Recently, Richard Dawkins unfolded 
his arguments against religion:
The natural temptation is to attribute the ap-
pearance of design to actual design itself. … The 
temptation is a false one, because the designer 
hypothesis immediately raises the larger prob-
lem of who designed the designer. The whole 
problem we started out with was the problem 
of explaining statistical improbability. It is ob-
viously no solution to postulate something 
even more improbable. We need a ‘crane’, not 
a ‘skyhook’, for only a crane can do the busi-
ness of working up gradually and plausibly from 
simplicity to otherwise improbable complex-
ity. The most ingenious and powerful crane so 
far discovered is Darwinian evolution by nat-
ural selection. Darwin and his successors have 
shown how living creatures, with their spec-
tacular statistical improbability and appearance 
of design, have evolved by slow, gradual degrees 
from simple beginnings. We can now safely say 
that the illusion of design in living creatures is 
just that—an illusion (188).
Dawkins bases his reasoning on the argu-
ments for God found in Semitic religions, es-
pecially Christianity. He does not consider the 
cosmological model of Vedanta. Had he taken 
into account Vedantic understanding, he would 
have immediately understood that Vedanta has a 
better concept of the ‘illusion’ he talks of. Also, 
there is no designer in Vedanta, and the cyclical 
evolution and involution are very scientifically 
explained, more cogently than the Darwinian 
model. Vedanta is the best ‘crane’ here. How 
could Dawkins miss that? But he is not alone. 
Almost all non-believers ignore Vedanta. It is as 
though they have developed a ‘blind spot’ to Ved-
anta. While the task of understanding Eastern 
religious traditions may be stupendous, that def-
initely cannot be an excuse for overlooking them. 
Explaining the apathy of media persons towards 
religion, a scholar writes: ‘Ignoring religion has 
also undercut the coverage of some Iraqi polit-
icians. In the aftermath of the Iraq War, journal-
ists and diplomats often reinforced each other’s 
preconceived notions and consistently misread 
the political scene.’ 8 ‘Religious complexity com-
pounds the effects of reportorial secular-
ism: American religion is extremely 
diverse, making sweeping gener-
alizations problematic. The 
great variety of faith trad-
itions, the internal div-
isions within each, and 
other nuances of reli-
gions itself make good 
reporting difficult. 
Thus, reporters are 
often at a loss even to 
identify a target’ (88).
Ignorance of 
Vedanta makes non-
believing thinkers re-
invent the wheel and 
suppose that they have ar-
rived at an understanding of 
a workable religion sans conflict 
and write the ‘Good Book’.9 The 
study of Vedanta would have saved these 
thinkers all the trouble, besides they would have 
been instrumental in taking Vedanta to a larger 
audience. All the reasoning against religion given 
by these non-believing thinkers is the very reason 
one should study Vedanta, as Vedanta does not 
have any of these shortcomings. For instance, 
Vedanta leads its adherents on a path of scientific 
and steady unfolding of one’s personality with-
out any rigidity. Alain de Botton, obviously not 
acquainted with Vedanta says: ‘Religions have 
been wise enough to establish elaborate calen-
dars and schedules which lay claim to the lengths 
as well as depths of their followers’ lives, letting 
no month, day or hour escape without adminis-
tration of a precisely calibrated dose of ideas. In 
the detailed way in which they tell the faithful to 
read, think, sing and do at almost every moment, 
religious agendas seem at once sublimely obses-
sive and calmingly thorough. … How free secu-
lar society leaves us by contrast. It expects 
that we will spontaneously find our 
way to the ideas that matter to 
us and gives us weekends off 
for consumption and re-
creation. Like science, it 
privileges discovery.’10 
Alain de Botton is un-
aware, though not so 
blissfully, that Ved-
anta leads one to 
precisely such spon-
taneous ‘discovery’. 
There is no regimen 
or drill in Vedanta, 
and it is this freedom 
from the ‘rut of regular-
ity’11 that Vivekananda 
preached. One wonders 
whether these scholars do not 
really know of Vedanta or are con-
sciously ignoring it.
Another example of this unexplained stud-
ied ignorance is the analysis of a philosopher 
who tells about, ‘something central to my athe-
ism: it is neither a conscious rejection of belief 
in God, nor a rejection of the possibility or de-
sirability of a form of transcendence or rapture 
that takes me outside of myself or beyond my-
self. It is merely the absence of God on my im-
aginative landscape as a possible source of such 
things. God, for me, as perhaps for [Thomas] 
Hobbes, is invisible in a very particular sense. 
God plays no role in my imaginative, reflective, 
or even emotional understanding of an engage-
ment with the world around me.’12 Considering 
that the author here talks of God in the limited 
sense of a God with form, or a theistic God, it is 
astonishingly ignorant for a responsible philoso-
pher to jump to such sweeping conclusions with-
out having studied Vedanta. Vedanta as preached 
by Vivekananda directs a person to study oneself 
and make choices in life. However, rationalists 
who have not taken time to study Vivekananda, 
claim that all religions are dogmatic: ‘So, in the 
end, my central policy recommendation is that 
we gently, firmly educate the people of the world, 
so that they can make truly informed choices 
about their lives. Ignorance is nothing shameful; 
imposing ignorance is shameful.’13 A little study 
of Vivekananda would have shown this philoso-
pher that not all religious thought is ‘shameful’.
Towed by Western thinkers, some Indian 
scholars have taken to the academic fad of dis-
missing all Indian thought, especially ancient 
thought. Continuing in the line of a breed of 
scholars who have taken upon themselves to 
shout down anything having its source in a San-
skrit text, some thinkers like Meera Nanda be-
lieve intelligence and religion do not go together. 
According to her, intelligent people should not 
profess any religious affiliation. Further, she be-
lieves that all intellectual tradition has its roots 
in the West, particularly in Marxism. That the 
East has much more analytical traditions like 
Nyaya is a fact she has completely ignored. She 
writes annoyingly: 
What passes as ‘the left’ in India today includes 
well-known personalities and social groups that 
I call ‘reactionary modernists’. These groups are 
mostly associated with neo-Gandhian com-
munitarians, who share the postmodernist 
and postcolonial suspicion of reason and the 
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Enlightenment, but not the postmodernist cri-
tique of existentialism. Thus, while they accept 
the postmodernist idea of cultural embedded-
ness of all ways of knowing (which reduces 
modern science to a mere ‘ethnoscience’ of the 
West), their view of ‘Indian mode’ of knowing 
and relating is essentially a Hindu, non-dualist 
mode, and their view of Indian community is 
an idealized dharmic, wholist community. (Can 
they be called ‘contingent postmodernists’ or 
‘strategic postmodernists’?). I call these intellec-
tuals, including internationally acclaimed stars 
like Ashis Nandy, Vandana Shiva, Partha Cha-
tterjee, Gayatri Spivak (in parts), Gyan Prakash, 
Dipesh Chakravarty, Veena Das, Claude Alva-
res and their numerous fellow travellers and 
followers, reactionary modernists because they 
seek to model their alternative modernities on 
the ‘innocent’, ‘genuinely archaic’ and suppos-
edly subaltern modes of knowing and living, 
completely ignoring the fact that these same 
local knowledges are, more often than not, pa-
tently irrational, obscurantist and downright 
oppressive to the same subaltern on whose be-
half these intellectuals claim to speak. Their 
de facto advocacy of Hindu tradition notwith-
standing, these intellectuals retain an aura of 
progressive left politics because of their as-
sociation with the classic left causes (anti- 
imperialism, multi-culturalism, feminism and 
environmentalism), although in my opinion, 
they are actually the bridge between the nation-
alist elements of the anti-capitalist left and the 
full-blown, fascist religious right.14
Meera Nanda’s criticism is at once, naive, over-
arching, reductionist, and dogmatic. She needs to 
understand that one can be intelligent and yet reli-
gious if one finds a religion that answers to reason 
as do many thoughts of the Far East. Enlighten-
ment or intelligence is not the sole possession of 
the ‘left’. One can study postmodernism, Marxism, 
and all other ‘isms’ and yet have an independent 
understanding of things. ‘Cultural embedded-
ness’ is not the copyright of ‘postmodernism’. A 
rational critique is also not limited to the post-
modern ambit. And, to say that anti-imperialism, 
multi-culturalism, feminism, and environmen-
talism are solely connected to Marxism or leftist 
thought, is definitely taking things too far. 
Many Indian scholars like her are aware of Ved-
anta and Vivekananda but are adamantly stub-
born to open up to newer vistas of knowledge of 
mainstream science, which they claim to repre-
sent. She says: ‘Like other reactionary modern-
ists before them, neo-Hindu philosophers seem 
to accept the challenge of the Enlightenment. 
… But, and here is the rub, they define the non-
sensory, intuitive or mystical experience, the so-
called “pure reason”, to be actually referring to real, 
causal entities and/or energies, which can be dir-
ectly “seen”, or “heard” by altering your conscious-
ness through yoga: mystical insight is interpreted 
as an empirical experience of natural order’ (157). 
Of course, true to her nature, here too Nanda be-
trays an adamant ignorance regarding mathemat-
ical extrapolations of science based on the limited 
empirical evidence of cosmological phenomena or 
the discipline of altering human neural networks 
called neuroplasticity. This superstitious stub-
bornness is what Vivekananda was up against:
In modern times, if a man quotes a Moses or a 
Buddha or a Christ, he is laughed at; but let him 
give the name of a Huxley, a Tyndall, or a Dar-
win, and it is swallowed without salt. ‘Huxley 
has said it’, that is enough for many. We are free 
from superstitions indeed! That was a religious 
superstition, and this a scientific superstition; 
only, in and through that superstition came 
life-giving ideas of spirituality; in and through 
this modern superstition come lust and greed. 
That superstition was worship of God, and this 
superstition is worship of filthy lucre, of fame 
or power. That is the difference.15
Vivekananda’s religion, which is essentially a 
rereading of Vedanta, is not based on any text, 
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personality, dogma, or doctrine. It does not even 
stress a rigid set of practices. It has no definite 
pattern, symbology, mythology, or ritual. The 
centre of this religion is the living being and 
its reason. Equipped with such reason, the liv-
ing being is asked to embark upon the quest to 
find the truth, the truth at all levels. This is not 
against science but only true to the spirit of sci-
entific enquiry. 
Vivekananda was fed up with weakening 
theories and practices of the extant religions, 
which soaked up all enthusiasm and energy of 
its followers leaving them as inert as a mass of 
jellyfish. To him the old religions had become 
a burden and the new religion, a necessity. The 
new religion was his perspective on Vedanta. 
He said: ‘The old religions said that he was an 
atheist who did not believe in God. The new 
religion says that he is an atheist who does not 
believe in himself ’ (2.301).
Religion: Public and Private
Vivekananda highlighted both the public and 
the private aspects of religion. On the societal 
level, he wanted India to hold on to religion as 
the basis of all its development: ‘Whether you ‘Ri
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believe in spirituality or not, for the sake of the 
national life, you have to get a hold on spiritual-
ity and keep to it’ (3.153–4).
While there is lot of disagreement on the so-
cial function of religion, its private or individual 
function is accepted my most thinkers. Viveka-
nanda stressed the importance of experiencing 
religion: ‘Religion is realisation; not talk, nor 
doctrine, nor theories, however beautiful they 
may be. It is being and becoming, not hearing 
or acknowledging; it is the whole soul becoming 
changed into what it believes. That is religion’ 
(2.396). On similar lines, some sociologists have 
stressed the need for religion to develop as an 
avenue for seeking peace by the individual. They 
affirm the need for a private space even within 
organized institutions for the individual to ex-
press one’s religion:
In modern, functionally differentiated societies, 
religious experiences of any sort have been as-
sumed to be confined either to a recognized re-
ligious institution or to the privacy of one’s own 
ecstasy. Religious institutions have become the 
sole social repository of mystery, according to 
this view, keeping it safely domesticated and out 
of public view. I would argue, however, that this 
is a very incomplete inventory of the presence 
of religion in society. If we take structured-yet-
improvised episodes of social interaction as our 
basis and recognize the necessary intersectionality 
of all such episodes, there is no a priori reason to 
assume that religious episodes will only happen in 
religious institutions or in private seclusion. If it 
is true that all social contexts contain multiple 
narratives, that schemas from one social arena 
can be transposed onto another, then it must be 
true that under certain conditions religious nar-
ratives may appear in settings outside officially 
religious bounds. No matter what the presumed 
functional arena, narratives of transcendence 
might intervene.16
In sum, the goal of a human being, according 
to Swami Vivekananda, is to arrive at a doubt-
free understanding of its personality, and religion 
is this metamorphosis of the chrysalis into the 
butterfly, of the weak into the strong, of the con-
fused into the enlightened. This is the core of re-
ligion; all other readings are mere veneers of this 
kernel. All unrest caused in the name of religion 
will be quieted if we focus on the kernel and let 
each individual have the freedom to adorn this 
kernel with a patina of one’s own liking. P
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